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ABSTRACT
Despite widespread use of smartphones, there is no measure-
ment standard targeted at smartphone security behaviors. In
this paper we translate a well-known cybersecurity behav-
ioral scale into the smartphone domain and show that we can
improve on this translation by following an established psy-
chometrics approach surveying 1011 participants. We design
a new 14-item Smartphone Security Behavioral Scale (SSBS)
exhibiting high reliability and good fit to a two-component
behavioural model based on technical versus social protection
strategies.
We then demonstrate how SSBS can be applied to measure
the influence of mental health issues on smartphone security
behavior intentions. We found significant correlations that
predict SSBS profiles from three types of MHIs. Conversely,
we are able to predict presence of MHIs using SSBS profiles.
We obtain prediction AUCs of 72.1% for Internet addiction,
75.8% for depression and 66.2% for insomnia.
Author Keywords
Psychometrics; Security behavior; Mobile Devices; Mental
Health
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→Usability in security and privacy;
Social aspects of security and privacy; •Human-centered
computing→ User studies; User models; •Information sys-
tems→ Mobile information processing systems;
INTRODUCTION
Smartphones have become an essential part of modern society.
In 2018, about 77% of U.S. adults owned smartphones, an
increase of 42% since 2011 [6]. Internationally, there are 3.3
billion active smartphone users, accounting for about 43% of
the whole world population [31]. With the advancement of
*The authors contributed equally.
mobile technologies, smartphones are now involved in almost
any daily activity. For instance, 70% of smartphone users ex-
changed emails, 65% connected with their friends and families
on social media, 73% looked up for directions, 59% watched
videos, and 45% did online shopping [14]. However, as smart-
phones have become a hub for storing and accessing personal
sensitive information [29], an increasing number and diversity
of malicious parties aim to exploit security vulnerabilities of
smartphones and their users.
Mobile operating system developers have been dedicated to
equipping their operating systems with a number of counter
measures (discretionary and mandatory access control, trusted
computing etc.). However, the security of such systems still
heavily relies on the behaviors and decision-making of users.
For instance, Android and iOS feature a permission model
to enable users to decide if they want to grant application
requests to access sensitive system resources and informa-
tion. Some repackaged malware apps aim to trick users by
mimicking the look-and-feel of popular legitimate apps with
subtle differences in their title or logo to attract users to down-
load and trust the app and further grant the permissions [62].
Other attacks target intricate configuration properties of smart-
phones: attackers can extract users’ passwords when they
access sensitive web domains (e.g. their bank account) from
their smartphones on a public network [36]; users who never
reset their advertising ID, can be subjected to fine-grained
profiling by advertising libraries; users who are not attentive
to the information provided by websites or applications can
become the victims of phishing attacks [42]. Since humans
play a such critical role in smartphone security, it is important
to understand users’ smartphone security behaviors.
When it comes to user behavior on smartphones, previous
studies have investigated users’ perceptions, attitudes, and
behaviors toward smartphone security. They found that users
tend to ignore warnings/messages [20, 30], have the miscon-
ceptions of the operation of smartphone security [30, 43], and
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show minimal attempts to protect their smartphones [13, 43].
Users’ careless behavior on smartphones can result from their
misunderstanding of smartphone operations. Most smartphone
users view their smartphone as just a mobile device for enter-
tainment and communication; they are not conscious that their
device is actually a handheld computer that is vulnerable to a
wide range of cyber attacks [33]. In these circumstances, will
users have different security protection behaviors from how
they address security on desktop and laptop computers? If so,
how can we measure users’ smartphone security behavior in a
systematic way across contexts?
Prior studies have measured users’ smartphone security behav-
iors in different ways. Some studies adopted field observation,
and some of them employed a self-reported approach [13, 28,
57]. Since field observations usually require more resources
and have limitations in assessing full aspects of security be-
haviors, most studies utilized self-reported measurements. In
terms of self-reported measurements, we found that many of
them developed their own measurements based on computer
security or adopted from smartphone measurements in other
contexts. Therefore, based on the current literature, there is an
need for a measurement system for security behavior that is
standardized and specific to smartphones.
To fill this research gap, the goal of this study is to provide a
model and analysis to support a standardized scale for mea-
suring users’ smartphone security behavior intentions based
on a systematic psychometric approach [44]. We present a
study with two phases evaluated on a total of 1011 partici-
pants. In our phase-1 study, we examined if the model of
general computer security behavior intentions could be ap-
plied to smartphone security behavior intentions. We adopted
four dimensions from a well-established measurement, Secu-
rity Behavior Intention Scale (SeBIS), developed by Egelman
and Peer [17] and examined the fitness of these dimensions on
users’ smartphone security behavior by factor analysis. Our
findings indicate that smartphone security behavior intentions
entails new dimensions that are different from the model of
general computer security behavior intentions. Therefore, in
our phase-2 study, we created a new scale measurement for
smartphone security using systematic scale development pro-
cedure. We also used multiple statistical analyses to ensure
the reliability and validity of our scale.
We illustrate potential applications of this measurement
method by applying our new scale to study the effects of
mental health issues (MHIs) in smartphone security behavior
intentions. This was partly inspired by recent findings sug-
gesting that smartphone usage can correlate with MHIs [48].
Our main objective is to answer the following understudied
research question: Do smartphone security behavior inten-
tions correlate with mental health issues? Toward this, we
analyze the relationship between smartphone-specific security
behavior intentions with prevalent MHIs such as Depression,
Insomnia and Internet Addiction. We leverage our online
survey to find that, there exist strong correlations between
smartphone security behavior intentions and these MHIs. To
explore further, we performed a statistical analysis to study the
predictability of smartphone security behavior intentions from
mental health scores. Here are two examples of our findings.
First, we found that participants with a score indicating pres-
ence of depression are more likely to perform stringent security
technical configurations on their smartphones in comparison
with participants with lower depression scores. Second, we
found that participants with a score indicating no presence
of severe Internet addiction are more likely to take stringent
social security decisions on their smartphones in comparison
with participants with higher Internet addiction scores.
To further explore the relationship between smartphone secu-
rity behavior intentions and mental health indicators, we then
asked the following research question: Can security behavior
intentions be used as predictors of MHIs? Even for a modest
size of data set, we indeed found strong evidence that off-the-
shelf binary machine learning classifiers trained with security
behavior intentions, can be leveraged to effectively predict
an MHI in a user based on his or her security behavior on a
smartphone. We also performed experiments to identify how
important is each SSBS behavior in those prediction tasks and
demonstrate how these behaviors can be monitored in prac-
tice on Android, the most widely used smartphone operating
system.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
•We found that new dimensions are important when measur-
ing smartphone security behaviors. These are different from
the general security behavior model.
•We developed a new standardized scale for smartphone secu-
rity behavior intentions (SSBS) which is based on two factors
(technical behaviors versus social behaviors) and showed good
psychometric properties with high internal consistency.
•We are the first to explore the effect of MHIs in smartphone
security behaviors.
•We found significant correlations between smartphone secu-
rity behaviors and some common MHIs.
•We developed feature sets based on SSBS that can be used
in machine learning models to predict certain MHIs. We
analyzed the importance of each feature on those prediction
tasks and demonstrated how they can be monitored in practice.
In the next section, we will review the literature that are most
related to our study and highlight research questions based on
our observed research gaps.
RELATED WORK
Prior works have examined users’ perceptions, attitudes, and
behaviors toward smartphone security. Their findings can
be summarized into three realms: the inattentiveness toward
security warnings/messages [20, 30], the misconceptions of
smartphone security [30, 43, 8], and low level of smartphone
security behavior [13, 43].
In terms of behavioral measurements, previous studies have
assessed users’ smartphone security behaviors via two main
approaches: field observation and self-reported measure-
ment. For field observations, most studies focus on two as-
pects: users’ authentication and locking behaviors on smart-
phones [25, 24, 22], and users’ behaviors on granting ac-
cess [21, 61, 2]. Although field observation can probe into
users’ actual behaviors in the real world, it usually focuses on
a single aspect of the behavior, making it difficult to conve-
niently gain a comprehensive understanding on users’ behav-
iors in a short period of time. Therefore, many studies adopt a
self-reported approach to measure users’ smartphone security
behaviors.
There are various means to measure self-reported smartphone
security behaviors. The most used approach in prior work is
to develop measurements by adapting more general computer
security assessments or by modifying a developed measure-
ment from previous studies. For example, Das and Khan [13]
generated a 6-item measure that was adapted from Microsoft’s
computing safety index. Jones and Chin [28] performed a sur-
vey study to investigate students’ usage and security behaviors
on smartphones by asking seven questions about security prac-
tices. A more recent study by Thompson et al. [57] designed
a five item measure to assess smartphone security behavior
in a personal context, which was adapted from a security
behavioral assessment in personal computer usage by Liang
and Xue [37]. Another recent (2018) survey study by Verki-
jika [59] examined south African users’ smartphone security
practices by using five questions that were adapted from the
measurement developed by Thompson et al. [57].
While reviewing developed security measurements, we found
that there is no standardized and targeted way to measure
smartphone security behavior (or behavior intentions) across
different contexts. Existing methods are all adopted or adapted
from general computer security behavior. However, it is pos-
sible that users’ smartphone behaviors can deviate from their
computer behaviors. For instance, Chin et al. [8] found that
participants’ behaviors and activities on smartphones were
quite different from their use of laptops. For example, users
were less likely to purchase and perform sensitive tasks on
their smartphones because of security concerns regarding mo-
bile devices.
We Identify two key gaps in the current literature: 1) there is
no standardized measurement of smartphone security behav-
iors across contexts; 2) it remains unclear if general computer
security behavior measurements is adequate to apply to as-
sess smartphone security behaviors. Thus, a key goal of this
study is to develop a standardized and valid measurement of
smartphone security behavior intentions that can be used in
different contexts. Toward this goal, we ask the following
concrete research questions:
• RQ1: How adequate is the application of general computer
security behavior measurement to smartphone security?
• RQ2: If the application of computer security behavior is
not adequate, can we develop a measurement tool which
can capture smartphone security behavior intentions?
APPROACH OF PSYCHOMETRICS
To answer these research questions, we adopted a psycho-
metric approach. Psychometrics is a scientific approach of
quantifying human psychological attributes, such as person-
ality traits, cognitive abilities, and social attitudes [40]. A
well-developed and widely-used security-related psychome-
tric measurement is the “Security Behavior Intention Scale”
(SeBIS) developed by Egelman and Peer [17]. They concep-
tualized users’ general security behavior as a psychological
construct instead of an actual behavior. We follow the same
approach to conceptualize users’ smartphone security behav-
ior as a psychological construct of behavioral intent that can
be predictive of actual behaviors.
We develop the Smartphone Security Behavioral Scale (SSBS),
a new measurement for assessing users’ behavior intentions to
comply with smartphone security practices. When developing
a new scale, it is important to evaluate three psychometric
properties of the measurement: dimensionality, scale reliabil-
ity, and convergent validity [44].
Dimensionality. Identifying dimensionality of a construct is
a critical part of scale development because whether the con-
struct is uni-dimensional or multi-dimensional will affect the
structure and computing approach of scale [44]. There are two
statistical approaches to determine dimensionality based on
the use case. If the goal of testing is to ‘explore’ the unknown
dimensions of a construct, the Exploratory Factor Analysis
(EFA) is an appropriate method to use. Then, if the goal is to
‘confirm’ or examine the existing dimensions of a construct,
the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is a standardized way
to test the fitness of the model.
Scale Reliability. In psychometrics, reliability represents the
consistency of a measurement, which can be evaluated in vari-
ous ways [44]. In this study, we focus on assessing “internal
consistency” of the scale to determine if multiple items in a
scale measure the same construct by examining Cronbach’s
alpha [12]. Cronbach’s alpha is the mean of all possible co-
efficients among items [11]. The cut-off point of Cronbach’s
alpha is 0.70 [45] that refers to the acceptable internal con-
sistency of the scale. In addition, considering the numbers of
items can affect the score of Cronbach’s alpha [11, 56], we
also report the mean of inter-item correlation (ITC), which is
the average pairwise correlation among all items and provides
a direct indicator of homogeneity [10].
Construct Validity. This refers to the degree to which a mea-
surement truly reflects the concept being examined [5]. One
approach is to evaluate convergent validity between the devel-
oping scale and an existing scale which measures the same
construct as the developing scale [46, 44]. Convergent va-
lidity is measured by correlational coefficients between the
new measure and an existing measure. In our study, we evalu-
ated the convergent validity between our scale and SeBIS [17]
and tested if our scale measures similar constructs of security
behavior.
Since there has been a well-established computer security
behavioral intentions scale (SeBIS), our first step was to ex-
amine if the dimensionality of SeBIS can be applied to users’
smartphone security behavior intentions. Our findings indicate
different dimensions of smartphone security. Therefore, we
followed a standardized procedure of scale development pro-
posed by Netemeyer [44]. Our procedure of scale development
is summarized as follows:
Table 1: Preliminary set of survey items developed based on SeBIS (smartphone-SeBIS)
Dim. ID Item µ σ
Device Securement
DS1 I use biometrics (fingerprint, face recognition) to unlock my smartphone. 2.41 1.6
DS2 I enable encrypted storage on my smartphone. 2.41 1.44
DS3 I use a rooted/jailbroken phone (r). 1.45 1.07
DS4 I turn on the “lost my device” feature on my smartphone. 2.5 1.6
DS5 I use a password/passcode to unlock my smartphone. 3.76 1.51
Password management
PM1 I regularly change my password for online services/accounts using my smartphone. 2.36 1.13
PM2 I share my smartphone’s passcode/PIN with other(s). (r) 1.51 0.99
PM3 I use password manager app to manage my passwords on my smartphone. 1.88 1.31
Proactive awareness
PA1 When downloading an app, I check that the app is from the official/expected source. 3.95 0.99
PA2 Before downloading a smartphone app I ensure the download is from official application stores (e.g. Apple App Store, GooglePlay, Amazon Appstore) 4.13 1.14
PA3 I reset my Advertising ID on my smartphone. 1.6 1.02
PA4 I manually revoke permissions from apps. 3 1.09
PA5 I grant smartphone apps the permissions they request. (r) 3.2 0.85
PA6 I disable geotagging of images captured by smartphone’s camera app. 3.23 1.48
PA7 I check which apps are running in the background. 3.33 1.14
PA8 I check my smartphone’s privacy settings. 3.31 1.17
PA9 When receiving a link from an unknown source via SMS, I click the link immediately. (r) 1.67 1.04
Update UP1 When I’m prompted about a software update on my smartphone, I install it right away. 3.3 1.13UP2 I make sure that the smartphone applications I use are up-to-date. 3.61 0.92
1. Testing the fitness of dimensional model of SeBIS on smart-
phone security behavior by applying CFA.
2. Defining the construct that the scale attempted to measure
and generating a list of candidate questions.
3. Extracting the dimensional components of the scale by per-
forming EFA and reducing the set of items.
4. Finalizing the scale by conducting CFA to confirm the fit-
ness of the new scale to the intended factorial model.
Methodology. The goal of this study is to develop a measure-
ment to assess users’ security behavior intentions to comply
with smartphone security advice recommended by security
professionals. We conducted a two-phase online survey study.
In phase-1, we tested the four dimensions used in SeBIS [17].
Our results suggest the possibility of improving on the four
dimensions of SeBIS when specializing to smartphone secu-
rity behavior intentions. That is, users’ smartphone security
behavior intentions could be different from the general com-
puter security behavior intentions. We therefore conducted a
phase-2 study to develop a new measurement for smartphone
security behavior intentions.
For both phases, we recruited participants from the United
States via Amazon Mechanical Turk. To ensure the quality of
data, we integrated attention-check questions in each section
of the survey. The attention-check questions were randomly
inserted in the questionnaire and had similar format to other
questions. Participants were required to select the choice re-
quired in the statement (for instance, I go to grocery shopping
on every Thursday. Please select ‘Never’). We removed the
responses from participants who failed to correctly answer
attention-check questions. We next describe the details of
study design and results for each phase of the study.
PHASE-1 STUDY: BUILDING THE SCALE UPON SEBIS
Survey design and item generation
We first developed a measurement, which we call smartphone-
SeBIS, based on the four dimensions of SeBIS: device se-
curement, password management, proactive awareness, and
update. We generated items by revising each question in
SeBIS to adapt to a smartphone context. For example, we
changed the wording of questions from ‘computer’ to ‘smart-
phone’. However, we encountered two challenges when using
this approach. First, we found that certain questions could
not be readily applied to smartphones. Second, certain com-
mon smartphone-specific security features were not included
in SeBIS, such as biometrics, usage of applications, and app
permissions. To capture a more comprehensive view of users’
smartphone security behaviors, we recruited security experts
who independently went over each item of the first version
of smartphone-SeBIS and considered how to revise old items
and add new items to the survey. Overall, we had four types
of item modifications: word/phrase substitution, word/phrase
revision, item deletion, and item addition.
Word/Phrase Substitution: we substituted words indicating the
context of a laptop or desktop machine to specifically describe
a smartphone. For instance, to capture the same behavior on
a smartphone device, we substituted the word “smartphone"
for “laptop or tablet” in the item “I use a password/passcode
to unlock my laptop or tablet.”
Word/Phrase Revision: some items could not be made
smartphone-specific with simple substitutions. For example,
“I do not change my passwords, unless I have to”. This was
revised to the following: “I regularly change my password
for online services/accounts using my smartphone”, where we
specified the password target to avoid confusion, and turn the
negative statement into a positive statement. We did this since
participants might be biased toward taking a defensive stance
against the negative behavior.
Item Deletion: Some of SeBIS items are not applicable to
the smartphone context. For instance, the item “When brows-
ing websites, I mouseover links to see where they go, before
clicking them” is not applicable on mobile devices since the
pointing mechanism on smartphones is different (mouse or
trackpad for desktops/laptops vs finger or stylus on mobile
devices). Such items were removed from the survey.
Item Addition: Several important smartphone security behav-
iors were not specified or included in SeBIS. For instance,
significant security mechanisms introduced by Original Equip-
ment Manufacturers (OEMs), or by the research community,
become obsolete if the user roots (or jailbreaks) their smart-
phone. This is an important “device securement” measurement
to take. Moreover, on smartphones, user privacy is preserved
through a permission system that allows users to determine
what device and personal information each installed third-party
app can access. This mechanism can also be compromised
if users become inattentive to permission requests or if they
never revoke permissions from apps [61, 20]. To address such
phenomena, we added relevant smartphone-specific items into
the survey.
Smartphone-SeBIS resulted from this exercise. It has a total
of 20 items targeting smartphone security behaviors (see Ta-
ble 1). We administered smartphone-SeBIS through an online
survey (Amazon MTurk) where participants were asked to
answer on a 5-point Likert-type scale (from ‘Never’ to ‘Al-
ways’). To avoid the priming effect of social desirability, we
advertised our study as ‘the use of smartphone and mental
health wellness’. In the survey questionnaire, we included
three measurements of mental health wellness (Patient Health
Questionnaire (PHQ-9), Insomnia Severity Index (ISI), and
Internet Addiction Test (IAT)), one measurement of general
computer security (SeBIS), and our preliminary measurement
smartphone-SeBIS. To prevent the order effect, all five survey
sections were randomized. After answering these five sections,
participants were asked about their demographics.
Survey demographics: we recruited a total of 100 participants.
Ages of participants were between 18 to 71 (µ=36.2, σ=11.4),
and 41 of them are female (41%). Thirteen percent of our
participants had a high school diploma (n=13); 36% had some
college or associate degree (n=36); 36% had bachelor’s degree
(n=36); and 15% had a graduate or professional degree (n=15).
The average time to take the survey was 11.7 minutes. Each
participant was rewarded $0.75 for their participation.
Results
The analysis shows that the internal reliability of the 20-item
smartphone-SeBIS is below the recommended cutoff point by
Nunnally (1978) (Cronbach’s α=.67<.70) [45]. We further
conducted Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to examine
whether our measurement of the construct is consistent with
SeBIS by the goodness-of-fit of data to the latent variable
model. We used several tests to determine the goodness-of-fit
of data to the model of SeBIS, including the Comparative Fit
Index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the Root Mean
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and the Standard-
ized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). According to our
results, the CFI and TLI were 0.565 and 0.490, which are be-
low the cutoff (0.90) recommended by Netemeyer et al. [44].
Furthermore, our RMSEA and SRMR are 0.127 and 0.152
respectively, which are above the recommended cutoff points
(a cutoff of 0.06 for RMSEA and 0.08 for SRMR [26]). These
results indicate poor goodness-of-fit of our data to smartphone-
SeBIS. That is: the revised four dimensions of smartphone-
SeBIS might not be the best fit for assessing users’ smartphone
security behavior intentions.
PHASE-2 STUDY: DEVELOPING SSBS
Survey design and item generation
To develop a new scale to measure users’ smartphone security
behavior intentions we employed the approach used by Egel-
man and Peer (2015). We first generated a list of smartphone
security behaviors and collected data on Amazon MTurk. Then
we conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) to extract
the effective items for assessing users’ smartphone security
behavior.
Item generation: According to Egelman and Peer [17], the
metric of security behaviors should be “applicable” to and
“widely accepted” by the majority of users. Therefore, we
generated the list of smartphone security behaviors based on
the views of security professionals. We invited 35 students
who majored in computer science and received substantial
professional training in cybersecurity to list 10 of the most
important smartphone security behaviors. Then two security
researchers categorized these and generated a list of behav-
iors. The researchers also examined public security advice
for smartphone security by the United States Computer Emer-
gency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to ensure no important
behaviors are missing from the list. Then, five security ex-
perts went through the list to determine if any item violated
the principles of applicability and acceptance. Our initial list
contained 45 behaviors. We then translated these behaviors
into personal statements. Participants were asked to read and
rate each statement on a five point scale of frequency (From
‘Never’ to ‘Always’).
Survey Demographics: we collected 487 responses via Ama-
zon MTurk. This is larger sample than the sample size rec-
ommended by Hair et al. (minimum of 5 participants per
item) [23]. The average age of participants was 34.6 and
44.8% are female (41%). About 11% of our participants had
high school diplomas (n=54); 29% had some college or asso-
ciate degree (n=142); 49.5% had a bachelor’s degree (n=241);
and 10.3% had a graduate or professional degree (n=50). The
average time taken to complete the surveay was 6.3 minutes.
Participants were paid $0.75 after completing the survey and
passing the validation checks.
Results
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Our analysis of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test is 0.92 indi-
cating the high sampling adequacy of variables, which suggest
suitability for further factor analysis. Considering a large set
of items, our approach was to refine our scales until the load-
ing of each item was above 0.5 and was twice more than its
loading on other components [52] after a Varimax rotation.
Furthermore, we used optimal coordinate to determine the
optimal number of factors, which is a non-graphical approach
for factor determination [50]. The optimal coordinate is a
determined point where the predicted eigenvalue is not greater
than or equal to the mean eigenvalue by performing linear
regression analysis of the last and (i+1)th eigenvalue [50]. By
using optimal coordinates, we can overcome a limitation of
subjective and unclear decision-making about the number of
components to retain [50].
We performed three rounds of EFA to finalize our scale of
smartphone security behavioral intention. In our first round
of EFA, we first conducted Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) and extracted five components in EFA based on opti-
mal coordinate analysis. Then we excluded 27 items based
on aforementioned loading criteria. In the second round of
EFA, we followed the same procedure and extracted three
components in EFA. Then, 3 items were excluded from the list
of items. In the third round of EFA, we also followed the same
procedure that performed in the last two rounds and extracted
2 components in EFA and retained the remaining 14 items.
The final set of items and their rotated factor loadings are
displayed in Table 3. According to each component’s items,
two themes appeared: technical (e.g., using VPN and anti-
virus app) and social (e.g., verifying the source of texts before
sharing, deleting suspicious communication) approaches. Our
scale includes these two subscales.
Reliability of the Scale
We adopted the same approach used by Egleman and Peer [17]
to examine the reliability of the scale based on three metrics.
First we employ Cronbach’s α , which is commonly used to
assess internal consistency of a group of items. As shown
in Table 3, the Cronbach’s α for the full scale is 0.80. For
subscales of technical and social approaches are 0.84 and 0.79
respectively. Our scale met the criteria of internal consistency
that requires both full scale and all subscales to be above
0.7 [46, 39]. Then we leverage item-total correlation (ITC),
which is the Pearson correlation between each item and the
mean of all other items. All of our items’ ITC are above the
recommended threshold of 0.2 [19].
While assessing the reliability of the scale, it is also important
to examine the diversity of the items of a scale and prevent the
redundancy of the items [1]. Toward this, we computed the
average inter-item correlation (IIC) that not only evaluates the
internal consistency but also tests the degree of redundancy
of a set of items on a scale [9, 49]. The recommended cor-
relational coefficient of IIC is between 0.20 and 0.40, which
suggests that the items contain sufficient diversity of variance
while they are still representative of the same construct [49].
ITC of both subscales fall within the range, which indicates
the adequate level between consistency and diversity. Based
on these three metrics, our full scale and sub-scales exhibit
high reliability.
Convergent Validity: Correlation with SeBIS
To ensure that we assess the construct of users’ security be-
havior, we measured the convergent validity of our scale and
SeBIS. Convergent validity is a type of criterion validity that
evaluate if a developed scale measures the same construct of
the ‘criterion’ scale. We used SeBIS as our criterion because it
is the only measure with high reliability for assessing security
behavioral intentions. We collected a new dataset with 66 par-
ticipants who completed both SeBIS and Smartphone Security
Behavior Scale (SSBS). Then we conducted Pearson’s correla-
tion between SeBIS and SSBS. The average score of SeBIS
has significantly positive correlation with the average score of
SSBS (r=.403, p=.0008). In addition, results show the positive
significant correlation between the subscales of SeBIS and
SSBS (see Table 2). These findings suggest that participants
who showed higher intentions in protecting their general secu-
rity were also more likely to protect their smartphone security.
This confirms that our scale is measuring a similar construct
with SeBIS, that of security behavior intentions.
Table 2: Pearson’s Correlation between SeBIS and SSBS
Correlation coefficient (p-value)
SeBIS / SSBS Technical approach Social approach
Device securement -.017 (p=.896) .060 (p=.628)
Password generation .290 (p=.018) .229 (p=.064)
Proactive awareness -.090 (p=.471) .614 (p<.0001)
Update .301 (p=.014) .431 (p=.0003)
Confirmatory data analysis
Our final step is to examine the goodness of fit of SSBS with
the hypothesized latent components by performing Confir-
matory Factor Analysis (CFA). We collected a new dataset
with 358 U.S. participants from Amazon MTurk in this final
round of survey. To avoid the priming effect on participants’
responses, we adopted the same approach employed in the
phase-1 study to advertise the survey as a research related to
users’ mobile phone usage and mental wellbeing. We then in-
cluded three measurements of mental health wellness (PHQ-9,
Insomnia Severity Index, and Internet Addiction Test), SeBIS,
SSBS and demographics items in the survey. All survey sec-
tions were randomized to avoid the order effect on participants’
responses. Moreover, we include attention-check questions in
each survey section and removed the responses which failed
to answer them correctly. In terms of demographics, 38%
(n=136) of our participants are female and the average age of
participants was 35.3 (σ=10.6). Each participant was paid $1
after completing the survey.
The reliability of full SSBS is 0.79 and it is 0.81 for the Tech-
nical subscale and 0.85 for the Social subscale. We conducted
PCA with a Varimax rotation and extracted two components.
The results show that all items were loaded on the same unique
component as found in the previous EFA. Then we conducted
CFA to examine the goodness-of-fit of the two-component
model for users’ smartphone security behavior intentions. We
used the same approach employed in Phase-1 study, we per-
formed multiple test to determine the goodness-of-fit of our
data to the model, including Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA), and the Standardized Root Mean
Square Residual (SRMR). Based on the analysis, the CFI and
TLI were 0.954 and 0.942, which are above the cutoff (0.90)
recommended by Netemeyer et al. [44]. Also, the RMSEA
and SRMR is 0.054 and 0.059 respectively. Both scores are
below the cutoff points recommended by [26]. Our results
show a well goodness-of-fit of our data to our hypothesized
two-component model. We also performed Pearson’s corre-
lation between the two subscales and found no significant
correlations.
APPLYING THE SCALE: RELATION TO MENTAL HEALTH
SSBS can be an enabler of studies in understanding the reper-
cussions of smartphone security behavior intentions. As an
example, we choose to study the relationship between smart-
phone security behavior intentions and mental health issues
(MHIs). We chose this application for the following reasons.
(1) MHIs are prevalent. Mental health issues (MHIs) affect
millions of people around the globe. According to NAMI, 1
in 5 adults in the US experiences mental illness in a given
Table 3: Factor loadings and reliability statistics of finalized scale
ID Item Technical Social Inter-total correlation
T1 I reset my Advertising ID on my smartphone. .787 0.52
T2 I hide device in my smartphone’s bluetooth settings. .639 0.47
T3 I change my passcode/PIN for my smartphone’s screen lock at a regular basis. .629 0.51
T4 I manually cover my smartphone’s screen when using it in the public area (e.g., bus or subway). .621 0.55
T5 I use an adblocker on my smartphone. .614 0.51
T6 I use an anti-virus app. .612 0.53
T7 I use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) app while connected to a public network. .604 0.42
T8 I turn off WiFi on my smartphone when not actively using it. .544 0.47
S1 I care about the source of the app when performing financial and/or shopping tasks on that app. .723 0.24
S2 When downloading an app, I check that the app is from the official/expected source. .677 0.36
S3 Before downloading a smartphone app I ensure the download is from official application stores. .677 0.21
S4 I verify the recipient/sender before sharing text messages or other information using smartphone apps. .609 0.41
S5 I delete any online communications (i.e., texts, emails, social media posts) that look suspicious. .552 0.25
S6 I pay attention to the pop-ups on my smartphone when connecting it to another device (e.g. laptop, desktop). .526 0.39
Cronbach’s alpha 0.84 0.79
Inter-item correlation 0.40 0.39
year, and 1 in 5 youth aged 13-28 experiences a severe mental
disorder art some point in their lives. Also, 16 million adults
in the US had at least one major depressive episode in 2018.
(2) Given existing evidence, we hypothesize that MHIs corre-
late with security behavior. Certain personality traits appear
more likely to lead to future mental illness [18]. Given that
people afflicted with MHIs tend to experience distinct psycho-
logical constructs, and because some personality traits (with
their own distinct psychological constructs) are shown to cause
security risks [58], [27], this led us to hypothesize that MHIs
could also correlate with security behavior.
(3) We are explicitly interested in better understanding the
relationship of MHIs with smartphone security behavior inten-
tions since this can have important socioeconomic applications.
For example, if people exhibiting a mental health issue tend to
follow bad security hygiene on their smartphones in a bring-
your-own-device (BYOD) enterprise setting, then enterprises
can use this to better estimate risk of security breaches and
also focus their security educational programs which will in
turn save the enterprise millions of dollars—according to the
Anti-Phishing Working Group direct and indirect phishing
incidents led to data breaches costing enterprises more than
$3.86 million dollars. On the other hand, if security behav-
iors are indicative of a person’s mental health this could be
weaponized by advertisers or insurance companies aiming to
profile and target vulnerable groups of the population [15].
Understanding the latter will allow us to better protect con-
sumers on their personal mobile devices from such aggressive
third-parties. Next we present our studies which apply SSBS
to tackle three concrete research questions.
• RQ3: Do people with MHIs have distinct smartphone secu-
rity behavior?
• RQ4: Can mental health issues be potentially leveraged as
an important predictor of smartphone security behaviors?
• RQ5: Can smartphone security attitudes be potentially lever-
aged as an important predictor of mental health issues?
To address RQ3, our survey results were analyzed using sta-
tistical comparison test to examine the relationship between
prevalent MHIs and smartphone security attitudes. Partici-
pants’ responses were categorized into groups showing procliv-
ity for a particular mental condition. Each group’s smartphone
security behavioral intentions (from SSBS) were compared
with a control group, which does not show the same proclivity.
To measure these proclivities we carefully select instruments
which can measure MHIs which are prevalent globally. This
would render our results more relevant to current societal
issues and facilitate recruitment. We hence focused on de-
pression which affects 300 million people worldwide [47] and
insomnia which affects half the global population [4]. Lastly,
we also include a form of addiction, Internet Addiction, which
gradually become prevalent in our society [34, 54].
For depression we used the Patient Health Questionnaire—
PHQ-9 [32, 38]. It’s brevity, construct and criterion validity
render it an ideal candidate for efficient distribution [32]. Fur-
thermore, previous work has confirmed that PHQ-9 is suitable
to be administered to participants [38]. The insomnia severity
index (ISI) [3, 41] was also found to be a reliable self-report
measure for evaluating sleep difficulties. For internet addic-
tion, we adopted the Internet Addiction Test (IAT) [60].
To address RQ4, we use a generalized linear model (GLM) to
assess the predictive influence of users’ mental health issues
on their smartphone security behavioral intentions. GLM is
a flexible generalization of ordinary linear regression model
that allows response variables to have non-normal distribution.
Considering the continuous nature of our response variable,
we predicted the response variable via a link function, which
specifies the link between random and systematic components.
The link shows how the linear predictor of explanatory vari-
ables relates to the expected value of the response.
To address RQ5, we utilize SSBS to construct features to train
and evaluate off-the-shelve machine learning binary classifiers.
Each classifier is tasked with predicting whether an individual
is likely to exhibit a specific mental health issue or not. To
better explain the classifiers’ performance and understand
which security attitudes contribute the most to the prediction
task, we further evaluated each individual feature’s influence
in the prediction performance.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES
AND SMARTPHONE SECURITY BEHAVIOR INTENTIONS
To study the relation between smartphone security behavioral
intentions and MHIs, we first convert the MHI scores (PHQ9,
ISI, IAT) into binary values. For each MHI, we decide a
threshold such that any score equal or above it would be con-
verted to a value of 1 (equivalent to having moderate or severe
symptoms) and any value below it would be converted to a 0
(equivalent to not having moderate or severe symptoms). For
Depression the threshold was set to a PHQ9 score of 10 [35],
for Insomnia it was set to an ISI score of 8, and for Internet
Addiction to an IAT score of 50. Moreover, since SSBS has
distinct items which are factored together to measure a specific
cybersecurity tendency, we average the Likert scores of the
items for each of its two subscales. This allows us to derive
for each participant an average score for each of the two dis-
tinct underlying constructs of SSBS, namely Technical and
Social. In total we observed 190/358 (53.1%) with high IAT
score, 117/358 (32.7%) participants with high PHQ9 score
and 197/358 (55.0%) with high ISI score.
Considering the non-normal distribution of our smartphone
security behavioral scales, we conducted non-parametric test
to examine the difference in mental health issues and smart-
phone security behaviors by using the Wilcoxon Rank Sum
test. Below we elaborate on our analysis results.
Depression and Smartphone Security Behavior. Our re-
sults show that participants with depression indicators reported
significantly higher behavioral intentions on adopting a tech-
nical strategy to protect their smartphones than those with
low depression scores (W=14524, p<.0001). Conversely, par-
ticipants with high depression scores reported significantly
lower social security behavioral intentions than those with low
depression scores (W=9022.5, p=.019).
Insomnia and Smartphone Security Behavior. Similarly,
we found that participants with high ISI score reported signif-
icantly higher behavioral intentions on adopting a technical
strategy to protect their smartphones than those with low ISI
score (W=19517, p=.0002). We also found that participants
with high ISI score reported significantly lower behavioral in-
tentions on using social strategies to protect their smartphones
than those with low insomnia scores (W=12118, p=.0001).
Internet Addiction and Smartphone Security Behavior.
For internet addiction, our results reveal a similar trend. Par-
ticipants with high IAT score reported significantly higher
behavioral intentions on adopting technical strategies to pro-
tect their smartphones than those with low internet addiction
scores (W=19684, p=.0002). On the other hand, participants
with high IAT score reported significantly lower behavioral
intentions in adopting social strategies than those with low
IAT score (W=9049.5, p<.0001).
PREDICTING SMARTPHONE SECURITY ATTITUDES
To understand whether mental health issues could potentially
predict smartphone security behavior attitudes (RQ4), we con-
ducted Generalized Linear Modeling (GLM) to examine the
predictive ability of the MHIs (depression, insomnia, and inter-
net addiction) on users’ mobile security behavioral intentions
by controlling their age, gender, and smartphone usage time.
The first model predicts users’ behavioral intentions toward
the Technical approach of smartphone security. Our results
show that participants with high PHQ9 score are significantly
more likely to show higher behavioral intentions toward tech-
nical strategies for smartphone security than those with low
PHQ9 score (β=0.361, t-value=2.79, p=.006). Yet, there is no
significant predictive power of insomnia and internet addiction
on technical smartphone security behaviors.
Focusing on the Social aspect we found that participants with
low IAT score are significantly more likely to show higher
behavioral intentions toward using social strategies to pro-
tect their smartphones than those who have high IAT score
(β=0.453, t-value=4.55, p<.0001). However, there are no sta-
tistically significant predictive differences in depression and
insomnia w.r.t social behaviors.
These results reveal an opportunity for enterprises to focus
their expensive security educational programs. For example,
educating employees with high PHQ9 scores about taking
technical measures to protect their smartphones can be highly
effective. Analogously, the same might be true when employ-
ees with high IAT scores are subjected to similar programs for
training on social smartphone security strategies. On the other
hand, adversaries might also leverage these results when tar-
geting users through technical means (malicious mobile apps)
or social engineering attacks (spam and phishing attacks).
PREDICTING MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES
Adversaries, advertising or insurance companies might also
try to identify or profile vulnerable groups. In this section, we
present how we model the prediction of MHIs based on secu-
rity behavior intentions and investigate whether such models
can be leveraged to launch profiling or targeted attacks.
Methodology
We predict an MHI issue (Depression, Insomnia, Internet Ad-
diction) based on the smartphone security behavioral scale
(SSBS). This resulted in a total of three classification tasks.
Each classification task was tackled using seven classification
algorithms (Logistic Regression, SVM, Random Forest, KNN,
Stratified, Most Frequent, Random). The first four are common
classification algorithms that are well suited for our problem.
We then implemented three simpler models which we use as
baselines and for helping interpretations of the results of the
above classifiers. The stratified model, generates predictions
by respecting the training set’s class distribution, the most
frequent model always chooses the label to be the most fre-
quently used label in the training set, and lastly the random
model assigns prediction uniformly at random.
Due to our relevantly small dataset we convert our tasks into
binary classification problems. Thus, for each MHI issue, we
decide a threshold such that any score equal or above it would
be converted to a value of 1 (equivalent to having moderate or
severe symptoms) and any value below it would be converted
to a 0 (equivalent to not having moderate or severe symptoms).
Table 4: Data Distributions
Training Data (n=268) Testing Data (n=90)
0 1 0 1
Internet Addiction 124 (46%) 144 (54%) 44 (48.9%) 46 (51.1%)
Depression 179 (67%) 89 (33%) 62 (68.9%) 28 (31.1%)
Insomnia 125 (47%) 143 (53%) 36 (40%) 54 (60%)
In terms of the independent variables (features) we use the
participant responses in the individual items of SSBS.
Then, split our participant responses into 75% (n=268) to be
used for training the classification models and 25% (n=90)
for testing them. Table 4 lists the label count in the training
and testing data for each MHI. We observe the low number
of participants with positive depression labels (label=1). This
is known as the class imbalance problem and in our case it
would prevent the depression classifiers from being able to
predict moderate or severe depression symptoms. To tackle
imbalanced datasets, one can either undersample the majority
class (label=0 in our case) or oversample the minority class
(label=1). We eliminated the undersampling approach as this
would further reduce our data. In terms of oversampling the
minority class, one could trivially replicate the minority class
multiple times. However this approach could suffer from
overfitting to a few minority class cases.. A better approach
(SMOTE) randomly picks a datapoint in the minority class
and adds synthetic points placed between it and its k-nearest
neighbors [7]. We used SMOTE on our training data which re-
sulted in an equal number of label values (179). To determine
the models’ hyperparameters we run 10-fold cross validation
for all models for each classification task.
Results
Table 5 summarizes our results. We evaluate all models on the
testing dataset (unseen data) and report each classifier’s AUC,
precision and recall. Intuitively AUC is a measure of how well
the model can distinguish between our two classes—the higher
the AUC the better the model is at predicting participants
with high MHI scores. Precision tells us how many of the
participants we labelled as positives are actually positives,
whereas recall tells us how many of all the positive participants
we managed to correctly label as positives.
We observe that the most straightforward models (Stratified,
Most Frequent, Random) have very low AUC which means
they are bad in distinguishing the positive (1) from the negative
labels (0). Our more sophisticated models trained on SSBS
items always improve the quality of the predictions. Due to
space limitations we omit their detailed results from Table 5.
Internet Addiction: We observe that SVM, Random For-
est and KNN achieve very good separability (AUC=70.3%,
70.9%, 72.1% respectively). However, SVM and Random
Forest tend to miss a lot of participants with high scores (re-
call=59%). On the other hand KNN achieves both good re-
call(72%) and good precision (70%).
Depression: SVM, Random Forest and KNN show good label
distinguishability (AUC=75.1%, 74.5%, 75.8% respectively)
and KNN being the only one with high recall (71%). In terms
of precision Random Forest is significantly better than the
Table 5: Predicting MHI scores from SSBS features (%)
Internet Addiction Precision Recall AUC
Logistic Regression 68 50 66.2
SVM 66 59 70.3
Random Forest 64 59 70.9
KNN 70 72 72.1
Depression Precision Recall AUC
Logistic Regression 52 57 68.3
SVM 54 50 75.1
Random Forest 64 57 74.5
KNN 54 71 75.8
Insomnia Precision Recall AUC
Logistic Regression 78 54 62.3
SVM 71 46 62.8
Random Forest 73 56 66.2
KNN 67 56 62.1
rest (64%). This shows that KNN might be preferable when
one wants to prioritize identifying most of the positive cases
than making sure that the positive labels are correctly assigned.
Advertisers might choose this overestimation strategy when
launching campaigns where coverage is important. On the
other hand, insurance companies might focus more on an
approach that does not unjustifiably overcharge clients and
thus might choose the Random Forest approach.
Insomnia: All classifiers struggle to achieve good separability
(only Random Forest comes close to 70%) and exhibit low
recall (high number of false negatives). However, Logistic
Regression, SVM and Random Forest achieve high precision
which indicates they could be potentially leveraged by insur-
ance companies or even by advertisers in targeted campaigns.
Analyzing the Influence of Individual Items
Our results show that it is possible to predict an individual’s
mental health status based on their smartphone security be-
havioral intentions. We further investigate the role of each
individual security attitude on the classification outcome and
develop an app to illustrate how these can be monitored in
practice on Android which enjoys more than 76% of the smart-
phone OS market share [55]. Figure 1 summarizes our results.
Internet addiction: Based on the best model of prediction
(KNN), we found that to observe the smartphone security
behaviors in practice one should focus on monitoring S5
(see Figure 1a). This corresponds to observing if the user
deletes any online communications that look suspicious (Ta-
ble 3). This is not a straightforward behavior to monitor.
It would entail monitoring SMSs, emails and posts on on-
line social accounts. On Android monitoring SMSs requires
the RECEIVE_SMS and READ_SMS permissions are granted.
The first allows us to register a broadcast receiver using
intent android.provider.Telephony.SMS_RECEIVED to
analyze all incoming SMSs and the latter allows us to tra-
verse all the received SMSs and determined whether a pre-
viously received one had been deleted. However the rest
(email and social posts) would require the user providing ac-
cess to their email and social accounts. Enterprises which
have access to privileged operations on mobile OS such as
(a) Internet Addiction (b) Depression (c) Insomnia
Figure 1: Relative Feature Importances (normalized 0-100) in predicting MHI score ranges from smartphone security behaviors.
Android and iOS might be able to do that but the same is
not true for third party applications. Another important fea-
ture for KNN is T4. For brevity we give the intuition: the
tracker app creates geolocation spaces corresponding to pub-
lic spaces and checks the proximity sensor when a sensitive
app is in the foreground. The tracker app only requires the
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION dangerous permission (accessing
the proximity sensor does not require a dangerous permission—
android.hardware.sensor.proximity).
Depression: S5 is again the most important feature for KNN
(higher recall) with S1 a close second. S1 requires monitor-
ing the source of the app when the user performs financial or
shopping tasks. This can be achieved using a whitelist of finan-
cial and shopping apps (we crawled the 100 top free and paid
apps from Google Play’s Finance and Shopping categories).
To monitor whether any of these are running on the fore-
ground we implemented a background process which period-
ically uses the ActivityManager.getRunningProcesses
Android API to retrieve the current foreground process which
is checked against the whitelist. If one chooses Random Forest
(higher precision), then the predominantly most important fea-
ture to monitor is T1 which corresponds to observing whether
the user changes their advertising id frequently. This is rela-
tively easy to monitor. Our Android tracker app uses a back-
ground thread which in turn uses an AdvertisingClient,
the getAdvertisingIdInfo() and getID methods to peri-
odically track changes to the Advertising ID.
Insomnia: If Random Forest is chosen, S5, T1, T3 and
T8 are the dominant features to monitor. T3 corresponds
to tracking changes in the passcode/PIN of the screen lock
of the smartphone. We achieve this on Android as fol-
lows: we extended the class DeviceAdminReceiver (a
BroadcastReveiver subclass on Android) and overrided its
onPasswordChanged() method. Note that this is part
of the Android Device Administration API and as such it
requires the app to request the BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN per-
mission. Alternatively a third-party app could leverage
the isKeyguardSecure() method of the KeygardManager
class to periodically check whether the device is using a
secure screen lock method including PIN ,pattern or pass-
word, or whether the SIM card is locked. T8 requires detect-
ing if the user turns off WiFi when not actively being used.
We implemented this with a broadcast receiver and a back-
ground process. Our broadcast receiver checks for the action
WifiManager.WIFI_STATE_CHANGED_ACTION , and if the
state of the WiFi is WifiManager.WIFI_STATE_DISABLING
(i.e., the WiFi is in the process of switching off) we launch a
background process which checks the device’s network (TCP
and UDP) connections as desscribed in Demetriou et al [16].
Alternatively one could choose Logistic Regression (most im-
portant T1, T4) or SVM (T1, T3).
In summary, we are the first to explore and demonstrate the
possibility of predicting MHI scores from smartphone security
behavior intentions. We further analyzed the importance of
each feature on each classification task and how these behav-
iors can be monitored in practice on the most popular mobile
OS.
DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK
Applications of Scale: From a lab to the field. Our new
scale of smartphone security behavior can be employed for
various purposes. Researchers may utilize this scale to assess
users’ intended smartphone security behaviors and investigate
how their behaviors change among different populations (simi-
lar to Sharif et al. [53] for SeBIS) or over time with educational
interventions. For instance, researchers who are interested in
the smartphone malware prevention may use SSBS to explore
which smartphone security behaviors may make users more
vulnerable to attacks. Researchers can also employ this scale
to predict users’ behaviors in the field and assess the effective-
ness of security interventions (e.g., warnings).
When it comes to the field, SSBS can be applied in different
ways. We provide three use cases in different contexts. Firstly,
in a healthcare context, a doctor who would like to use health-
related apps for treatment or self-management may use this
scale to determine if her patients need educational interven-
tions before utilizing the app. Secondly, in a workplace, em-
ployers can use this scale to evaluate accidental insider threats
on employees’ use of smartphone and further implement in-
terventions and measure employees’ behavioral changes on
smartphone security over time. Thirdly, in an educational
context, schools can deploy the scale and assess both teachers
and students’ smartphone security behaviors while embracing
smartphone into online education. Schools may also apply this
scale to detect the degree of vulnerability of their students and
faculties to potential cyberthreats through smartphones (e.g.,
cyberbullying, stalking, etc.). Enterprises can also leverage
these to design personalized and subject-based cybersecurity
educational programs for their employees.
Limitations and Future Work. In this study, we developed a
smartphone security behavior (intentions) scale with high inter-
nal consistency and convergent validity. Yet, its predictability
of users’ actual smartphone security behavior has not been
confirmed. Therefore, we next plan to conduct a field exper-
iment and test how effective is the scale in predicting users’
real behaviors. Also, like the majority of psychometric mea-
surements, SSBS may raise concerns of a self-reported ap-
proach. In order to reduce potential social desirability bias,
we took several precautionary procedures: being careful about
wording questions in a non-judgmental way, making survey
anonymous, and keeping the purpose of survey vague. For
data cleaning, we excluded unattended responses [51]. In our
future work, we will cross-validate the mitigation of social de-
sirability effect by comparing observed data and self-reported
data with different populations.
CONCLUSION
In this work we found that smartphone security behavior dif-
fers from general security behavior. Driven by this, we carried
out a series of factor analyses to create a Smartphone Security
Behavior Scale (SSBS) with 14 questions that load onto two
factors: technical (using technical strategies to protect smart-
phones) and social (being contextually cautious while using
smarpthones). Our scale exhibited satisfactory psychometric
properties: the full scale and both the subscales have high
internal consistency, all items map uniquely on one single
component, and no correlation exists between the subscales.
We establish convergent validity between SSBS and a well
established security behavior measurement. To showcase the
application of SSBS we perform a first-of-its-kind analysis of
the effects of popular mental health issues (MHIs) in smart-
phone security behavior intentions. We found that individuals
with high depression indicators are significantly more likely
to use technical strategies to protect their smartphones than
individuals with low depression indicators; while individuals
with low internet addiction indicators are significantly more
likely to use social strategies than those with high internet
addiction indicators. Lastly we show that smartphone secu-
rity behavior intentions can be potentially leveraged to profile
individuals according to MHIs and illustrate how the most
important behaviors for this task can be monitored by a third-
party application on the most popular mobile operating system
(Android).
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